UNYKORN Wallet

Wallet — connect

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Try a movement — see what a custody-native response looks like

POSTs to 127.0.0.1:7331/intent if a local vault is running. If not, shows the canonical response the policy engine would produce for that amount. Reminder: allowed means policy passed. It does not mean funds moved — custodian submission is gated (see status board).

Amount (USD, integer minor-units × 100) Wallet Destination

Response

Ready. Values here are echoed from the vault, not simulated by this page.

What the policy engine says

Three real decisions from the demo run — refused, needs-two-approvers, allowed.

2,500,000 USD

to 0xA1b2C3d4…9F

POLICY DENIED

Value exceeds daily ceiling ($1.5M) and destination is not on the allowlist.

4910 · reason: ceiling_and_destination · intent_9k7fr2ab

961,021.51 USD

to 0x00000000…00dEaD

PENDING APPROVALS

1 of 2 signed

Signer plane signed. Policy officer signature outstanding.

4911 · required: 2 · current: 1 · intent_qz3f1x8k

400 USDC

to 0x00000000…00dEaD

ALLOWED (policy passed)

Under ceiling; destination on allowlist; recovery proven; single-signer wallet.

200 · receipt idx 4021 · sha fd1d77…998923 · signer 822031A6DE1DB81C

Note. "Allowed" is a decision, not a settlement. Custodian submission (BitGo Express) is gated — see status board.

Example wallet — topology

M Helen Construction Escrow Pool — wal_m-helen-escrow

2-of-3 BitGoProxy base recovery proven

User key: Unykorn signer plane.
Backup key: offline, YubiKey 5C (office safe).
Custodian key: BitGo Bank & Trust, N.A.

	MetaMask	BitGo	UNYKORN x402
Human signs each tx	yes	yes	no (agent-authorised)
Agent can spend continuously	no	via API keys (broad)	yes (narrow, bounded)
Budget-bounded	no	per-key limits	yes (per-tx + total)
Destination-locked	no	whitelists	yes (allowlist per capability)
Auto-expiring	no	no	notBefore / expiresAt
Revocable	no	key rotation	yes (nonce revocation)
Cannot sign / cannot approve	n/a	n/a	by construction
Blast radius if compromised	full wallet	key scope	remaining budget → allowlist

IssuerAuthority	Meaning	Typical issuer
Reg D 506(b)	Private placement, no general solicitation, up to 35 non-accredited	Private funds, RIA syndicates
Reg D 506(c)	Private placement with general solicitation, accredited-only, verified	Marketed RIA offerings, tokenised real estate
Reg S	Offshore-only distribution	Non-US issuers, non-US buyers
Reg A+	Mini-IPO, up to $75M/year, accredited + retail	Growth-stage issuers pre-registration
Registered	SEC-registered offering under S-1 / F-1 / etc.	Public issuers, listed securities
LicensedIssuer	The dollar door. Chartered bank, or permitted stablecoin issuer under its own licence.	Circle, First Digital, banks with trust powers
NotASecurity	Instrument is not a security — counsel-memo-gated, refused without one	Utility credits, closed-loop points

SettlementVenue	What it means for the register
BookEntry	Registrar of record, nothing touches a chain. This is what a transfer agent runs on — holders don't transfer, the intermediary does. The register is authoritative and the chain is optional. Answers the banks + broker-dealers question.
AlternativeTradingSystem	ATS-based settlement — venue-of-record for the trade, register still authoritative
OnChainPermissioned	ERC-3643 shaped. `contract: Option<String>` is `None` today because no smart contract is deployed by this repo — that leg is client-chosen and client-deployed
OmnibusCustody	Positions held omnibus by a custodian; the register maps beneficial owners under a single wallet

ComplianceRule (7)	Enforcement · who may hold
RequireVerifiedRecipient	Recipient identity must be verified on file before receipt.
JurisdictionAllowlist	Country / state / OFAC-level allow-list.
JurisdictionBlocklist	Country / state / OFAC-level block-list.
HoldingPeriod	Reg D / Reg S resale restrictions enforced by the register.
MaxHoldersOfRecord	Section 12(g) 2,000-holder ceiling / 500 non-accredited ceiling.
MaxPositionPerHolder	Concentration limits — beneficial-owner level.
AgentOnlyTransfers	The broker-dealer back-office primitive. Holders cannot transfer; the intermediary transfers on their behalf. Register authoritative.

Chain support	Status
EVM (Ethereum, Base, Arbitrum, Polygon)	gated — chain adapters defined, no token contract deployed by this repo
Bitcoin	gated — adapter defined, no minting path here
Solana	gated — adapter defined; SPL / Token-2022 client-deployed
XRPL	gated — no MPT / trust-line issuance in this repo
Stellar	gated — no asset issuance with authorization / clawback flags in this repo

Custody, policy, recovery and issuance — with a capability layer for agents.

Wallet — connect

Session

Try a movement — see what a custody-native response looks like

What the policy engine says

Example wallet — topology

x402 · Capability tokensThe layer that neither BitGo nor MetaMask has.

Issuance railThe register, the compliance engine, the supply ceiling — the parts a bank or broker-dealer back office actually runs on.

Status boardWhat's real, what's gated, what's thin.

Security postureWhat the code refuses, what has been found, what remains.

1 critical · client-asserted quorum

5 high · controls displayed as active while unenforced

Verified correct

Remediation — 14–19 engineer-days for C + H

InstallBring the vault online on your own machine.

Control plane

Extension

SDK / dapp integration

Component	Status	Reason
Recovery ceremony (SLIP-0039)	real	Threshold reconstruction rehearsed and one-share-short negative-control proven before a wallet can exist. Printable custodian cards produced.
Policy engine (refusals, approvals, ceilings)	real	Pure evaluation; no I/O. Runs identically on control plane and signer plane by design.
Approval flow — four-eyes quorum	real	Multi-signer sequencing with self-approval never counting toward quorum.
Audit record (receipt chain, offline-verifiable)	real	ML-DSA-65 detached signatures over canonical bytes. Anyone with the signer's public key can verify the chain independently.
Phone pairing (QR)	real	One-shot pair codes over the /pair/ routes.
Issuance register + attestation ceiling	real	Ceiling recomputed per mint — never cached, because caching outlives the evidence it depends on.
x402 capability tokens	real	Ed25519, domain-separated. In-process ledger tracks spend + revocation.
EIP-1193 + EIP-6963 provider	real	`packages/vault-sdk/src/provider.mjs` speaks EIP-1193 fully; adds the `uny_*` namespace.
Custodian submission (BitGo Express)	gated	`allowed` currently means policy passed. Wire step 7 of `create_intent` to `uny-bitgo` against TEST env before shipping this claim.
Threshold signing (Tss) / HSM backend	gated	BitGoProxy is the production key path. Local Tss is a placeholder trait.
Live balance feed	gated	Recovery tier reports a floor and says so, rather than reading balances that might not exist.
/admin/reload endpoint	gated	Provisioning currently requires a service restart. Reload path documented; not written.
Card · Cover · Mesh backends	thin	Extension tabs render `standby`. Nothing behind them yet. Honest UI is not a bug.
Issuance rail — legal + register types	real	7 `IssuerAuthority` variants, 4 `SettlementVenue`, 7 `ComplianceRule`, `Attestation::compute_ceiling` recomputed per mint. Operator name refused as issuer at compile time.
Issuance ↔ policy engine pipe (mints produce receipts, gated by policy)	real	`uny-issuance-flow` (1,808 LOC, 29 tests). Mint, burn and position transfer project into the same `TransferIntent` the movement engine already evaluates. One set of rules governs both paths — no second policy implementation to drift. Three receipts per action — request, decision, effect. Refusals are recorded too.
Register ↔ supply reconciliation	real	A commit that would leave `registry.total() != instrument.supply` refuses rather than recording the break. The sharpest claim the rail can make: an instrument's supply cannot change without a policy decision and a receipt.
Smart contracts on any chain (ERC-3643, XRPL MPT, Stellar issued asset, SPL / Token-2022)	thin	Zero `.sol` / on-chain deploys in this repo — by design. The chain leg is client-chosen and client-deployed under the client's own licence. `SettlementVenue::OnChainPermissioned.contract` is `Option<String>` and defaults to `None`.
Live attestation feed → `compute_ceiling`	gated	The type is real and tested; nothing pushes a real reserve balance into it. When wired, staleness halts minting automatically — the ceiling is never cached.
vault-sdk instrument surface (dapps see instruments / holders / transfer verdicts)	thin	vault-sdk speaks EIP-1193 + EIP-6963 today and exposes wallets and movements only. It does not yet expose `uny_listInstruments` / `uny_transferVerdict`. Next after the pipe.
`make ci` — fmt + clippy -D warnings + tests + release build	real	Green for the first time as of commit `fbacc68`. Pre-existing clippy failures in `uny-recovery`, `uny-bitgo`, `uny-store`, `uny-pq`, `uny-api` are all fixed. Workspace passes `clippy -D warnings`.
`cargo audit` — dependency vulnerabilities	real	237 dependencies against 1,190 advisories — zero vulnerabilities as of 2026-08-08.
Internal adversarial security review	gated	Completed 2026-08-08 to third-party standards by the author. 1 critical, 5 high, 6 medium, 4 low. Remediation window 14–19 engineer-days for critical + high, 20–29 for all. Full report at `SECURITY-REVIEW-2026-08-08.md`. Two operational restrictions active (see hero).
External third-party audit	thin	Not commissioned. Runs after remediation of critical + high findings. Named firm required before any wallet holds client money. Prereq to first paying institutional client.